

Post-Quantum Cryptography based on Lattices

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Quantum-resistant alternatives

Multivariate
Equations


Hash-tree
based
algorithms


Lattice-based
algorithms
(LWE, Ring-LWE, NTRU)

Supersingular
isogeny DH
(SIDH)

Code-
based
systems


Why lattices?

- 
- Widely studied
(~20 years of literature)
 - Versatile
(allow to build complex cryptographic primitives like FHE)
 - As fast as RSA or EC schemes
(highly parallelizable)

- 
- Medium sized keys
(shrinking over time)

Learning With Errors (LWE)

- Computational domain:
vectors in \mathbb{Z}_q : they have coefficients bounded by q
- **Public** random matrix and vector
- **Secret** vector with small components



Hardness of LWE


Intuition:

A lattice is a grid of point identified by a matrix, e.g., A .

As is a point P in the lattice identified by A .



Adding e means perturbing the lattice so that now P could be **anywhere** in the space.



Hardness of LWE

Factoring

Fix a length l (i.e., the number of ciphers).
Given a number N find a *prime* p that divides N .



The security of the schemes based on factoring relies on N .
How to choose N ? Let's try with random N .

$$99'848'813 = 9887 * 10099$$

Hardness of LWE

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99'848'810 Not hard: 2 divides N !

Hardness of LWE

Factoring

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N should be chosen carefully!


Hardness of LWE

Worst-case to average-case reduction

If I can solve an instance of LWE chosen at **random**, then I can solve the **worst** possible LWE instance.



Lattices of dimension n .




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
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Result:

Choose a random matrix **A**.



LWE is hard to solve!



$$\begin{bmatrix} \blacksquare & \blacksquare & \blacksquare \\ \blacksquare & \blacksquare & \blacksquare \\ \blacksquare & \blacksquare & \blacksquare \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} \blacksquare \\ \blacksquare \\ \blacksquare \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \blacksquare \\ \blacksquare \\ \blacksquare \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \blacksquare \\ \blacksquare \\ \blacksquare \end{bmatrix}$$

State of the art

Practical

Impractical

Cryptographic Protocols

Digital
Signature

Identity-
Based
Encryption

Fully-Homomorphic
Encryption

Group
Signatures

Encryption

Key Exchange

Blind
Signatures

Basic Internet Security

Advanced Privacy Enhancement

(Ring)-LWE Problem

Hard Lattice Problems

Challenges

No efficient quantum resistant solutions for advanced cryptographic schemes are known.

In classic crypto advanced schemes are constructed by **composing crypto primitives**.

- Known quantum resistant realizations of crypto primitives
- do not compose efficiently and
 - lack features needed for using them as building block.

Summary:

- ✦ Well-studied problems
- ✦ Basic crypto primitives are already practical:
 - **Google** tested a lattice-based signature (NewHope)
 - **NIST** standardization process ongoing.
- ✦ Advanced protocols are the new focus of research.

THANK YOU!