

# Some Mathematical Topics in Symmetric Ciphers

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## Symmetric Cryptography; private key

**Abstract Definition of a cipher:** a set of transformations  $E_k$  (**round functions**) of one space  $M$  (the set of possible messages) into a second space  $C$  (the set of possible cryptograms). Each particular transformation of the set corresponds to enciphering with a particular **key**. The transformations are supposed reversible so that unique deciphering is possible when the **key** is known.

1. In a *block cypher* the space of the messages  $M$  and the space of the cryptograms  $C$  coincide. Moreover,

$$M = C = \{0, 1\}^n = V(n, 2)$$

$n$  is the length of the code.

2. for any fixed key  $k$ , the *encryption function*  $E_k$  is a permutation of  $V$

**Iterated ciphers:** obtained by the composition of a finite number  $l$  of rounds. The *encryption function* is given by the composition of some permutations, called round functions: if  $k$  is a key,  $E_k$  is given by the composition of  $l$  rounds  $\rho_{k,i}$ :

$$E_k = \rho_{k,1} \circ \rho_{k,2} \circ \cdots \circ \rho_{k,l}$$

Included: some common ciphers (AES , SERPENT, PRESENT),

**MATHEMATICS** in particular: **groups**

Back to DES: Kaliski, Rivest and Sherman (1988) considered the question

**Is DES (that is, the set of transformations it defines) a group?**

Why?

Triple DES was being suggested as an improvement to DES:

Let  $T_a$  be a DES transformation, corresponding to the key  $a$ . The  $T_a$  are permutations of the message space, that is, elements of  $Sym(2^n)$  acting on the elements of the vector space  $\{0, 1\}^n$ .

- Suppose  $\{T_a, : a \in V\}$  is a group, that is, for all keys  $a, b$  there is a key  $c$  such that  $T_a T_b = T_c$ . Then Triple DES would make no sense;
- They gave some evidence that DES is not a group and K. W. Campbell and M. J. Wiener, in 1993 proved that DES is not a group
- Kaliski et al. showed that if the group generated by the transformations of a cipher is too small, then the cipher is exposed to certain cryptanalytic attacks.
- In 1993 Wernsdorf proved that the the round functions of DES generate the alternating group.

The Group of round functions, we call  $\Gamma_{\infty}(C)$ , is **not** the group of the Cipher  $C$ ,  $\Gamma(C)$ .

$$\Gamma_{\infty}(C) = \langle \rho_{k,i}, k \in K \rangle; \quad \Gamma(C) = \langle E_k, k \in K \rangle$$

,

**BUT**: for a large class of ciphers, we were able to obtain informations for  $\Gamma_{\infty}(C)$ , **not** for  $\Gamma(C)$  .

### **Some properties of the group $\Gamma(C)$ :**

The group must be primitive: In 1999, Paterson showed that if  $\Gamma(C)$  is an imprimitive group, then it is possible to embed a trapdoor in the cipher. However, the primitivity of  $\Gamma_\infty(C)$  does not guarantee the absence of trap-doors.

A trapdoor is a hidden structure of the cipher, whose knowledge allows an attacker to obtain information on the key or to decrypt certain ciphertexts)

**Primitive group** If  $\Omega = \{1, \dots, n\}$  a transitive permutation group  $H \leq \text{Sym}(\Omega)$  is primitive if it does not admit a non trivial block-system.

$$\{\Delta_1, \dots, \Delta_t\}$$

is a block- system, if it is a partition of  $\Omega$ , permuted by  $G$ .

A subgroup of an imprimitive group is imprimitive.

It makes sense to check if  $\Gamma_\infty(C)$  is primitive.



Our cipher  $C$ :

$$V = V_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus V_s,$$

$s > 1$ , where each  $V_i$  has the same dimension  $m$  over  $GF(2)$ , that is  $n = ms$ . For  $v \in V$ , we will write  $v = v_1 + \cdots + v_s$ ,  $v_i \in V_i$ . Also, we consider the projections  $\pi_i : V \rightarrow V_i$ , which map  $v \mapsto v_i$ . For  $\gamma \in Sym(n)$ , we have

$$v\gamma = v_1\gamma_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus v_s\gamma_s,$$

for some  $\gamma_i \in Sym(V_i)$ , is a bricklayer transformation and any  $\gamma_i$  is a brick. maps  $\gamma_i$  are traditionally called  $S$ -boxes and map  $\gamma$  is called a parallel  $S$ -box.

A linear map  $\lambda : V \rightarrow V$  is called a **proper mixing layer** if no sum of some of the  $V_i$  (except 0 and  $V$ ) is invariant under  $\lambda$ .

In AES  $V = M = \{0, 1\}^{128}$ ,  $m = 8$ ,  $s = 16$ . the S-boxes are all equal, and consist of inversion in the field  $GF(2^8) = V_i$  with  $2^8$  elements, followed by an affine transformation: a linear transformation  $+$  translation.  $\lambda$  is the composition of so called **MixColumns** and another linear map called **ShiftRows**

round functions:  $\gamma\lambda\tau_k$ , with  $\tau_k$  translation given by the key  $k$ .

In this case, it is easy to answer to Paterson's question here:

**an imprimitivity system consists indeed of the cosets of a subspace  $U$  of the message space  $V$ . I.e.**

$$\{v + U : v \in V\}$$

where  $v + U = \{v + u : u \in U\}$ .

There are no such trapdoors in AES/Rijndael.

**O'Nan-Scott Theorem** about classification of primitive groups  
 $\rightarrow \Gamma_\infty(C) = Alt(2^n)$  or  $\Gamma_\infty(C) = Sym(2^n)$ . As the rounds are even-So  $\Gamma_\infty(C) = Alt(2^n)$

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